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1. INTRODUCTION 
Niet alle middelen om deze legitieme doelen te bereiken, zijn echter in een 
democratische rechtsstaat aanvaardbaar.1 - with these words Cyrille Fijnaut 
commented on a discussion about state reactions to a series of exceptionally 
brutal assaults upon targets of civil daily life, such as supermarkets, restaurants 
and factories in Belgium. The individuals responsible for the attacks, attributed 
to a group calling itself Bende van Nijvel, were never found. But Belgium and its 
neighbours were in shock and discussed at length the limitations of a legal system 
when confronted with acts of terrorism. 
15 years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New :York took place, which 
dramatically altered the whole context of discussions about fighting terrori~m, 
in the US as well as in Europe.2 Since then the EU has launched several initiatives 
and has adopted various legal acts, which are looked upon as necessary by 
politicians and law enforcement agencies, but have been criticized by civil 
liberties organizations. The killing of Osama bin Laden by US special forces in 
Pakistan in May 2011, has ultimately shown that terrorism takes a legal system 
to its limit by blurring the lines of criminal justice enforcement and armed 
conflict. 
Cyrille Fijnaut, who started his working career as a policeman, always held 
firm beliefs about Rechtsstaatlichkeit and the importance of a fair trial, not only 
during his days on patrol but also later in his academic work. His work related to 
the fight against terrorism illustrates his core belief, that a criminal justice system 
cannot bend to accommodate security concerns, not even· those of international 
Professor Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, University of Basel. 
C. Fijnaut, 'Terrorisme, politiek en wetenschap', in: Panopticon, 1986, p. 1: "Not all measures 
are available in a democratic state goverend by the rule oflaw, even if the goal to achieve may 
be a legitimate one." 
See V. Mitsilegas, 'Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation after Lisbon', in: Eucrim, 
nr. 3, 2010, pp. 111-117, p. 111; A. Oehmichen, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The 
Terrorised Legislator? (Antwerp, 2009), pp. 341-356. 
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efforts. Each measure must serve the purposes of criminal law or rather criminal 
punishment, and must fit into the broad concept of a democratic society 
respecting human rights and the rule of law. 3 
During Cyrille Fijnaut's professional life criminal justice systems all over the 
world, including those in Europe, have been pushed to the edge by international 
terrorism - or, rather, the measures adopted to fight such acts, because it is often 
the countermeasures used against terrorism that seem to blur important legal 
lines between the role of the criminal justice system and other measures, 
especially military interventions. The arguments following a "just war" reasoning 
pose a challenge, not least for the traditional European rechtsstaat. 
2. EU-FRAMEWORK AS AN EXAMPLE 
Combating terrorism has been high on the EU's criminal law agenda for quite a 
while. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Commission 
immediately set in motion a series of initiatives to establish Framework 
Decisions defining terrorism and to provide punishment parameters for 
Member States. The Commission also established the means for more efficient 
cooperation between Member States, such as the introduction of the European 
Arrest Warrant, which now basically replaces traditional extradition procedures 
within Europe. Several other legal acts followed. The listing of terrorists, the 
freezing of their assets without legal remedies and the removal of certain fair 
trial guarantees has led to some now well-known and interesting case law 
re-asserting the principles of due process.4 Today, legal instruments that give 
Member States access to personal data and enable its exchange between them 
are considered key tools in the pursuit of terrorists. 5 Two EU Framework 
Decisions serve as the anchor - for which Cyrille Fijnaut has asked frequently6 -
930 
See e.g. C. Fijnaut, 'The attacks on 11 September 2001, and the Immediate Response of The 
European Union and the United States', in: C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters en F. Naert (eds.), Legal 
instruments in the fight against international terrorism; a transatlantic dialogue. (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) pp. 15-36, pp. 22-26. 
See e.g. ECJ "Kadi" of3 September 2008 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P; EC "Omar" 
of 11 June 2009, T-318/0; ECJ "E.F." of29.6.2010 Case C-550/09; see G. de Burca, The European 
Court ofJustice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal (2010), pp. 1-50; S. Gless and D. Schaffner, 'Judicial review of freezing orders due to a 
UN listing by European Courts', in: S. Braum and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Le controle 
juridictionnel dans l'espace penal europeen, The judicial control in EU cooperation in criminal 
matters. (Bruxelles, 2009), pp. 163-193. 
See e.g. V. Mitsilegas (2010), pp. 111-113; K.L. Scheppele, 'Other Peoples' PATRIOT Acts: 
Europe's Response to 9/11', in: Loyola Law Review, 50, 2004, pp. 89-148. 
See C. Fijnaut (2004), p. 24. 
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for the various follow-up measures that aim to fight and prevent terrorism. 
These are: 
- Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism ofJune 13th, 2002;7 
- Framework Decision 2008/91_9/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. 8 
The Framework Decisions are predominantly vehicles for the harmonization of 
substantive criminal law as, in addition· to defining terrorism, and guiding 
criminal procedure and the law of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, 
they also oblige Member States to criminalize certain behaviour as terrorist acts 
and extend their jurisdiction in order to enable them to prosecute these acts (or 
extradite the individuals concerned to another State for prosecution). The 
Framework Decisions are quite detailed in many respects. Despite, or rather 
because of the regulations, two basic questions however remain: 1) What acts are 
actually punishable as act.s of terrorism? 2) How should EU Member States react 
to terrorism - given their commitment to the democratische rechtsstaat, human 
rights, and the principle of proportionality? 
The two legal acts and their implementation by EU Member States 
demonstrate the challenge of special terrorist legislation. Four aspects are of 
particular interest: 
a) the definition of terrorism currently governing EU law; 
b) EU Member States' duty to punish, even on the grounds of imprecise EU 
parameters; 
c) the obligation to expand the scope of Member States' jurisdiction in order to 
fight terrorism; and 
d) possible infringements of human rights. 
3. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
One core issue in the legal fight against terrorism is settling on a valid definition 
of terrorism itself, since a common definition is a prerequisite for harmonization 
as well as for the effective cooperation between States to. combat the various 
aspects of terrorism. 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 164 of22 June 2002. 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 330 of 9 December 2008. 
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3.1. THE CONTEXT 
The EU definition of terrorism is established in Article 1(1) of the 2002 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism, and is basically three-fold: 
consisting of the aim of the action, the intention of the actor and the specific act 
being committed. 
The Framework Decision defines aim, or rather context and intent, matter-
of-factly as being: "to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organisation". There is 1) neither reference to core values, like democracy, 
liberty, equality ruling that system nor 2) the cross-border or international 
element. 
The second gap appears at first sight to be a rather technical aspect: According 
to EU law, namely Article 83 of the Tr~aty on the Functioning of the EU, the EU 
is only competent to "establish minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particular serious crime with a 
cross-border dimension".9 But the establishment of an EU parameter for terrorism, 
which will hereafter encompass all forms of alleged terrorist activity goes beyond 
the scope of Article 83 because it obliges all EU Member States to fight internal 
national activism according to the EU standards, and thus impinges of a State's 
sovereign right to solve internal conflict issues according to its own agenda. The 
importance of this aspect becomes clear when looking at the first mentioned gap 
in the definition of terrorism, i.e. the lack of a reference to the long term 
intentions of an actor: Is it the same in the eyes of the law whether a liberal 
democracy shall be destabilized or a dictatorship? Must all violent acts be labelled 
terrorism? 
3.2. ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICALLY NEUTRAL 
DEFINITION 
What appears as a shortcoming at first glance might, however, turn out to be a 
big achievement. There has been a lively debate since the 1950s, especially within 
the United Nations, as to whether national liberation movements should be 
excluded from the definition of terrorism.10 In 1977 the Council _of Europe 
agreed on a common European definition of terrorism, which did not take into 
account the long-term projects violent actors might have. This was because 
distinguishing a terrorist from a freedom fighter is very difficult, as the often 
10 
932 
OJ, C 83/47 of30 March 2010. 
C. Greenwood, 'War, Terrorism and International Law', in: C. Greenwood (ed.), Essays on War 
in International Law. (London, 2006), pp. 409-10. 
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quoted phrase "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" 
demonstrates. 
It has thus often been deemed unwise to put a criminal court, responsible for 
handing down a verdict of personal guilt in a certain case, in the position of 
having to pass judgment on a political situation at the same time. 
A definition detached from any reference to values (like democracy or 
Rechtsstaat) or reasons for committing the terrorist act (like freedom fighting) 
nevertheless leads to problems if a state wishes - maybe for good reasons - not to 
condemn certain violent acts as terrorist acts. This problem gets worse as a 
trigger mechanism for a duty to crimi~alize "terrorism" is set by superior law, 
like in the EU. This means that States cannot react individually to the particular 
challenges that they as individual States may face, such as the existence of a 
national political movement which has members who may resort to violence in 
an attempt to achieve their ends. 
Some examples, drawn from the list of Nobel peace laureates, illustrate the 
problem of individuals perceived by some States to be pursuing an illegal cause, 
and who could even be defined as "terrorists". They include inter alia Menachem 
Begin (head of Irgun Tzwai Le'umi, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978); 
Yassir Arrafat (for belonging to the PLO, and a Nobel Peace Prize winner in 
1994); Nelson Mandela (for belonging to the ANC, equally a Nobel Peace Prize 
winner). 
Today however, the discussion about drawing the line between legitimate 
freedom fighters and terrorists is replaced by the functional approach oflooking 
at the actions as such.11 
3.3. TERRORIST ACTS 
In Article 1(1) of the 2002 EU Framework Decision, specified acts which are 
criminal are defined first. These include attacks upon persons' lives or their 
physical integrity, kidnapping or hostage taking, or interfering with or disrupting 
the supply of water, power or any other fundamental resource the effect of which 
is to endanger human life, etc. 
Whereas the first Framework Decision of 2002 only obliged Member States to 
punish a rather limited number of acts linked to terrorist activities in its 
Article 3, such as aggravated theft committed with a view to facilitate terrorist 
acts. Extortion committed with a view to the perpetration of terrorist acts, the 
drawing up of false administrative documents with a view to committing 
terrorist acts 
11 S. Kirsch and A. Oehmichen, 'Judges gone astray: The fabrication of terrorism as an 
international crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', in: Durham Law Review Online, 
nr. l, 2011, pp. 11-13. 
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The 2008 Framework Decision broadened the obligation to include several 
more acts linked to terrorist activities or rather to prepare, organise or supporting 
terrorism, such as: 
a) "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" - meaning distributing, or 
otherwise making available, a message to the public, with the intent to incite 
the commission of a terrorist act; 
b) "recruitment for terrorism" - meaning to solicit another person to commit a 
terrorist act; 
c) "training for terrorism" - meaning to provide instruction in the making or 
use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous 
substances, or instructing individuals in other specific methods or 
techniques, for the purpose of committing a terrorist act. 
Moreover, the obligation to prosecute exists even if a terrorist offence was never 
actually committed in the end. This is provided for in Article 3(3) of the 2008 
Framework Decision. Article 4 obliges Member States to punish the aiding or 
abetting, inciting or the attempt to commit terrorist acts. 
Thus Member States' obligation to punish is quite broad and rather vague, 
and it appears unclear how national legislators will implement the EU parameters 
into national law. 
3.4. TERRORISM IN (CUSTOMARY) INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Did the EU lawmaker fall short in his duty to provide a comprehensive definition 
- or is the task of defining punishable terrorism (as opposed to justified freedom 
fighting) an unanswerable dilemma? 
The definition of terrorism has been in law journal's headlines recently12 
following the decision handed down by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which 
- among other things - defined terrorism as a crime according to customary 
international law, 13 and thus in principle binding for all States, including EU 
Member States.14 
According to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon rules of international law 





K. Ambos, 'Judicial creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of 
Terrorism under International Law?', in: Leiden Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 1; S. 
Kirsch and A. Oehmichen (2011), p. 1. 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, Feb. 16, 2011 ('Decision'), nos. 85 and 102. 
Whether the tribunal's judges were right to press ahead with a definition in the case before 
them, may be left open here. For a critique see K. Ambos (2011), pp. 11-12; S. Kirsch and A. 
Oehmichen (2011), pp. 6-7. 
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life, limb and property, including a concrete threat or an attempt15 to commit 
such an act, as the only objective element of the offence.16 Many academics still 
hold the view that currently no universal definition of terrorism exists.17 This 
position is exemplified by Schmid and Jongman18 who have analysed 109 
different definitions of terrorism and isolated 22 different elements characterising 
terrorism. Later, in a report, Schmid suggested a definition of terrorism, which 
has latterly become famous due to its simplicity: acts of terrorism are defined as 
"peacetime equivalents of war crimes".19 This definition blurs again however the 
legal parameters of such crimes, some of which are to prosecuted as crimes in a 
national criminal justice systems and some of which, the more serious ones, 
which shall be taken care of by the nascent international criminal justice systems, 
or even outside of the criminal justice system altogether by triggering a reaction 
based on international humanitarian law 
4. SOLVING THE DILEMMA WITH JUST WAR 
ARGUMENTS? 
Part of the dilemma terrorism poses to legal systems is that of drawing lines 
between criminal law measures and responses that may be labeled either as 
military or humanitarian interventions. Both of these forms of intervention lie 
beyond the scope of national criminal justice systems, and carry the risk of being 
viewed as acts of terrorism themselves. 
The 2002 Framework Decision recognizes this paradox with recital 11 of the 
preamble asserting: "Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflicts, 






Article 2(2) International Convention for the Suppression ofTerrorist Bombings, A/RES/52/164 
of 15 Dec. 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S 256; Article 2(3) International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, A/Res/54/109 of9 Dec. 1999, 391.L.M. 270; Article l(a) Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 Dec. 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 106; Article 2(1) 
(d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, 14 Dec. 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 168; all conventions can be found at www.un.org/ 
terrorism/instruments.shtml. 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/Rl76bis, Feb. 16, 2011 ('Decision'), no. 188. 
E.g. K. Ambos (2011), p. 12; E. Stubbins Bates, IBA Taskforce on Terrorism, R. Goldstone, E. 
Cotran, G. de Vries, J. Hall, J. Mendez and J. Rehman, Terrorism and International Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. l; M. Ch. Bassiouni, 'Terrorism: the Persistent 
Dilemma of Legitimacy', in: Case Western Reserve Journal for International Law, 36 (2&3), 
2004; S. Kirsch and A. Oehmichen (2011), pp. 7-8. 
P. Schmid, A. Jongman and M. Stohl, Political Terrorism - a New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. (Amsterdam/New Brunswick, North-Holland 
Pub. Co.,1988, 2nd. Edition), pp. 5-8. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Definitions of Terrorism. Available at: <http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20070527145632/www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html> 
(Accessed on 27 April 2011). 
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these terms under that law ... cannot be viewed as terrorism." However, this 
exemption clause is again based on a "just war" argument, i.e. the assumption 
that certain circumstances may in fact transform violence from what may 
otherwise be considered to be an act of terrorism into an act of freedom 
fighting. 20 
References to the "just war" argument have dominated political discussions, 
especially in the U.S., with regard to Al-Qaeda. A reference to the "just war" 
argument in a legal document on terrorism provoked however a series of 
questions, including: may such a principle be applied to (politically motivated) 
violence at all? If this is answered in the affirmative, certain justifications could 
be invoked to transform violence from an evil to a non-evil-action. Not only 
· States themselves are provided with some protections in this way insofar as 
State intervention is exempted from any terrorism charge without further 
question, but also other groups or individuals as well. How these exemption 
clauses can be accommodated within the wider fight against terrorism and 
whether they simply open a Pandora's Box of difficulties remain moot 
questions. 
5. FIGHTING TERRORISM BY MEANS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 
It would nevertheless be unfair to judge efforts designed to fight terrorism by 
means of the criminal law, like those foreseen in the EU-Framework Decisions, 
solely on the fact that they do not solve the historically difficult distinction 
between terrorism and freedom fighting. Criticism should rather focus on the 
special use of criminal law in a certain system, like that established by the 
Framework Decisions. Basically, the EU act does two things: 
a) compel Member States to punish certain acts, and 
b) force Member States to claim wide jurisdiction in order to ensure prosecution. 
20 
21 
These obligations correspond in general with the demands of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, which deduced from rules of international law two 
obligations on States and non-State actors: 
1) the obligation to refrain from engaging in acts of terrorism, and 
2) the obligation to prevent and repress terrorism, and in particular to 
prosecute and try alleged perpetrators. 21 
S. Peers, 'EU Responses to Terrorism', in: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, 
2003, pp. 236-238. 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/Rl76bis, Feb. 16, 2011 ('Decision'), no. 102. 
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5.1. OBLIGATION TO PUNISH 
The Framework Decisions - as explained above - oblige Member States to punish 
certain behaviour as terrorist acts. This fact can be interpreted quite differently: 
It could be viewed as progress towards a united fight against terrorism or as an 
EU infringement on State sovereignty and a violation of a democratically 
legitimized law. 
The duty to criminalize, established by the Framework Decisions, is quite 
broad - as illustrated previously - especially if one bends the rather imprecise 
language to encompass all its possible meanings, for instance when criminalizing 
acts of preparation and/or conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism.22 
The EU obligation is thus problematic, taking into account the basic question 
of a European competence to define criminal terrorist acts in the first place and 
the Framework Decision's failure to frame punishable terrorist activities in a 
precise language.23 Nonetheless, in attempting to come up with definitions it is 
important to keep in mind - as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht phrased it 
in its 2009 Lisbon Judgement - that: "decisions on substantive and formal 
criminal law are particularly important to the ability of a constitutional state to 
democratically shape its laws."24 
However, seven years earlier, the 2002 Framework Decision set out to compel 
Member States to punish certain acts of "terrorism" on the grounds of EU 
parameters laid out in the Framework Decision. And, this Framework Decision 
does not meet in all aspects the requirements of precise language and coherent 
concepts that govern most of the different Member States' criminal justice 
systems. 
One must furthermore always keep in mind the fact that, in practice, the 
importance of anti-terrorist legislation is often not the elements of crime that it 
defines, but the special investigative methods or other measure provided to deal 






For critical views see e.g. S. Melander, 'The Use of Criminal Law in Combatting Terrorism - a 
Nordic Perspective', in: K. Ligeti (ed.) Homage to Imre A. Wiener. (Toulouse, AIDP No. 22, 
2010), pp. 121-123. 
S. Peers (2003), pp. 230-232. 
BVerfG - 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09, 
no. 252; see <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en. 
html>. 
A. Oehmichen, 'Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of Reactive Anti-terror 
Legislation and Long-term Consequences', in: German Law Journal, 9, 2008, pp. 855-887; S. 
Peers (2003), pp. 237-243. 
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5.2. EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION 
The EU Framework Decisions also obliges the Member States to expand their 
criminal jurisdiction. According to Article 9 of the 2002 Framework Decision, 
each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish: 
- territorial jurisdiction (extending the concept to vessels flying its flag and 
aircraft registered there); 
- jurisdiction based on a broad ~oncept of the active personality principle 
(including acts committed by "residents" and legal persons as well as 
citizens); 
- jurisdiction based on a broad concept of the protective principle, where acts 
are committed "against the institutions or people" of that Member State or an 
EU institution or body based there. 
Given that EU Member States have not yet settled on a legal act which allocates 
clear-cut jurisdiction to one EU State in cases of a positive competence conflict, 
the obligation to expand jurisdiction and potentially intensify the problem of 
multiple jurisdictions is striking. 
5.3. INFRINGEMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
In addition, anti-terrorist legislation always raises concerns about the adequate 
protection of human rights and civil liberties. The European authorities have, 
however, realised by now that respect for human rights adds to the legitimacy of 
the fight against terrorism, and thus strive for compliance with human rights as 
well as spreading respect of human rights in order to ensure that there is a sound 
basis for cooperation with third countries. 
On the face of it, such concern seems unnecessary anyway, since Article 2 of 
the 2008 Framework Decision explicitly declares that: "[The] Framework 
Decision shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to take measures in 
contradiction of fundamental principles relating to freedom of expression, in 
particular freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other media as 
they result from constitutional traditions or rules governing the rights and 
responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, the press or other media 
where these rules relate to the determination or limitation ofliability." 
The legal effect and impact of Article 2 to a particular case remains 
nonetheless somewhat unclear. Could a defendant raise an objection based on an 
infringement of Article 2 of the 2008 Framework Decision? Or could a Member 
State raise, for instance, a reservation of national freedom of expression if its 
national criminal laws were to be screened before the ECJ because the penal 
statutes against terrorism were judged too lenient from a Brussels point of view? 
938 Intersentia 
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Before the 2008 amendment, the Framework Decision of 2002 only stated in 
its preamble that the Union is "based on the principle of democracy and the 
principle of the rule of law" and that the Framework Decision "respects 
fundamental rights" as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and Member States" constitutions and "observes the principle 
recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, agreed in December 
2000.26 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, however, rejected the 
invoking of human rights protections for violent political acts committed in the 
territory of signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights in 
general: Given that all of them are considered to be democratic countries, and 
have made a commitment to human rights protection, political violence may be 
treated like any other serious criminal offence.27 However in recent judgements 
the ECtHR has been firm in Human Rights protection as regards of certain 
consequences like preventive detention as well as deportation or expulsidn of 
terrorist suspects, if they cannot be convicted in a criminal trial. 28 Thus the FD's 
parameters for substantive criminal law should only raise concern with regard to 
the incrimination of non-violent actions, such as alleged recruitment for 
terrorism in certain situations, which touch upon the freedom of association, the 
freedom of speech and expression as well as on the principle of legal certainty. 29 
But there is still little relevant case law up to now. 
Counter terrorism legislation often collides with the right to freedom of 
speech because it often seeks to suppress certain politically motivated acts. 
Furthermore, terrorism, or rather the fear of terrorism, is also often used to 
justify the use of special police and prosecution powers that reduce the usual 
protection of fair trial guarantees relating to investigations, detention, and 







The preamble further asserts that the Framework Decision could not be interpreted to "reduce 
or restrict fundamental rights or freedom such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of 
association and of expression, including the right of everyone to form and join trade unions ... 
and the related right to demonstrate". 
See furthermore ECtHR of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71 (Ireland v. UK); ECtHR of 27. 
September 1995 no. 18984/91 (McCann and Others v. United Kingdom). 
See e.g. ECtHR of 19. February 2009, no. 3455/05 "A v. UK" or ECtHR of 28 February 2008, 
no. 37201/06 "Sadi v. Italy" or ECtHR of 29 March 2009, no. 38128/06 (Ben Salah v. Italy). 
ECtHR of 26 April 1979, no. 6538 (Sunday Times v. United Kingdom). ECtHR. of 30 January 
1998, no. 6538, (United Communist Party v. Turkey); ECtHRofl3 February 2003, nos. 41340/98, 
41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, (Welfare Party v. Turkey). 
See precedent footnote as well as judgments regarding infiltration of undercover agents in 
terrorist organisation ECtHR of 5 February 2008, no. 74420/01 (Ramanauskas v. Lithuania) or 
ECtHR of 10 March 2009 (Beykov v. Russia), which are only legitimate if there is an adequate 
legal base and a guarantee of supervision of independent authority as well as a clear distinction 
between identifying perpetrators and inciting an innocent person; regarding collection and 
automatic procession of data (data mining), see ECtHR of 4 May 2000, no. 28341/95 (Rotaru v. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The EU Framework Decisions provide the grounds on which Member States 
have, at least partly, built their national criminal sanctions against terrorism. In 
doing so, legislators - at the European and the State level - have had to create 
systems which allow them to fight violent attacks effectively, but which do not 
cause unwanted consequences on other levels. Two tasks - to which Cyrille 
Fijnaut has drawn our attention for many years31 - appear to be of most 
importance here: 
First, the respective criminal laws must draw an adequate line between those 
groups advancing legitimate political goals with controversial means and those 
which have crossed the line, not only propagating illegitimate political goals, but 
using punishable means. This task, even in theory, has all the appeal of an 
impossible mission. In practice, within each of these two movements, the law 
must again distinguish between those who principally use violent means and 
those who advance the same political goal, but principally by non-violent means. 
In criminal law that line runs, for instance, between perpetrators and participants 
and the dean-handed. Once again, legal instruments have to take into account 
on the one hand the fact that political groups are ofte~ difficult to define and do 
not always control the actions of associated individuals, and, on the other, the 
fact that the perceived legitimacy of violence against the State is inevitably bound 
up with the perceived legitimacy of that State's political system. 
Second, when the legislator has succeeded in defining punishable terrorism, 
he must follow a clear, deliberate and feasible agenda, for instance regarding 
cross-border cooperation in establishing a valid framework for exchange of 
alleged perpetrators or of evidence needed in criminal trials. 
Using the criminal law against terrorists may prove to be not only difficult 
and sometimes ineffective, but in some situations dangerous itself. A careless 
phrasing of criminal law or a perfunctory framework for international 
cooperation as well as ill-founded, but harsh reactions to "terrorists" and their 
supporters potentially risks alienating moderate critics of the State, increasing 
the ranks of violent opponents of the system and thus paradoxically further 
increasing the risk to public safety. Most profoundly, a reaction to terrorism that 
undermines the protection of democracy and human rights, including ~he right 
to a fair trial, damages the very values and principles upon which liberal 
democratic states have founded their political legitimacy. 
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